Admissibility of Expert Reports in Small Claims Court

In Turner v. Kitchener (City) [2011] O.J. No. 4803, there was a mid-trial ruling on the admissibility of an expert report in Small Claims Court.

The facts of this case involve a plaintiff who was riding his bike along a recreational trail in Kitchener. It was his regular route and time of travel which put him on the trail at 5:15 am.

Earlier that morning vandals had set fire to a bridge along the trail and after investigating, the police and fire personnel had blocked off the bridge with a wooden barricade and yellow caution tape.

The plaintiff was biking at a relatively high speed for the time of morning, was wearing a helmet but did not have any light affixed to his bike. As the plaintiff approached the barricade, he was not able to see it, and when he did notice it is was too late to stop safely. The plaintiff applied his brakes so hard that he flipped over the bike and suffered injuries.

At trial, the plaintiff attempted to admit into evidence a report from a professional engineer. Defence counsel objected and intended to cross-examine the expert and challenge the admissibility of his report based on the evidence of qualifications.

The deputy trial judge held that the report was admissible. He cited section
27(1) of the Courts of Justice Act which provides the Small Claims Court (“SCC”) with the general authority to “accept and act on lower-quality evidence than would otherwise be permitted under the common law rules of evidence”.

He then examined the SCC Rule 18.02 subsections (1) to (7) and held that the position of defence counsel as he intended to cross-examine the expert is not contemplated by the Rules and that the report had already been admitted into evidence by way of Rule 18.02 (1) to (3). Admissibility of documents under Rule 18.02 is to be determined at the initial stage under Rule 18.02(1) when the document is tendered - “Once the document is admitted, the witness may be-cross-examined using the summons procedure under rule 18.02(4). But since that is cross-examination,the rule presupposes that the report or document is already admitted into evidence. The report or document serves as the examination-in-chief of that
witness.”

The deputy judge found no merit in the defendant’s objection to the expert’s qualifications. The expert was a professional engineer and his qualifications to provide the opinion evidence were of the highest quality generally seen in civil courts.

- Alison McBurney

OPCF 44R - Family Protection Endorsement

The Court of Appeal recently affirmed a lower court decision on the OPCF44R.

In Van Bastelaar v. Bentley, [2011] O.J. No. 4666 (C.A.), the plaintiffs were concerned that the defendant's $1,000,000 policy would be apportioned between four injured parties and there would be a shortfall. As a result, they added their own insurer pursuant to the inadequately insured motorist provisions of their policy. Their policy had a Family Protection Endorsement with limits of $1,000,000. The key provision read as follows:

The insurer's maximum liability under this change form, regardless of the number of eligible claimants or insured persons injured or killed or the number of automobiles insured under the Policy, is the amount by which the limit of family protection coverage exceeds the total of all limits of motor vehicle liability insurance, or bonds, or cash deposits, or other financial guarantees as required by law in lieu of such insurance, of the inadequately insured motorist and of any person any person jointly liable with that motorist.

The motions judge held that "An underinsurer's obligation to pay does not arise until the total amount of insurance held by the tortfeasor at the moment of the accident is less than the family protection coverage liability limit." He concluded that since "the policies of the parties are unevenly matched, so therefore, the underinsurer had no exposure to liability".

The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision.

- Tara Pollitt

McQueen v. Echelon General Insurance Co. [2011] O.J. No. 4563 (Ont CA)

Appeal by the insurer from an award of accident benefits and damages for mental distress.

At trial, the plaintiff sought housekeeping, transportation, costs of medical assessments and damages for bad faith and mental distress.

The insurer made three major arguments on the issue of damages for mental distress:

1. That there was procedural unfairness based on the trial judge’s
consideration of conduct unrelated to rejected claims for statutory
accident benefits;

2. That merely denying benefits does mean that there was bad faith; and

3. That the trial judge lacked jurisdiction to make an award for mental
distress.

The trial judge quickly dismissed the initial two arguments by concluding that the plaintiff was seeking to recover damages for more than the SABS benefits and that this was not a case where the insured simply denied benefits.

In regards to the allegation that there was merely a denial of benefits the appeal judge agreed with the trial judge on the following points:

• The insurer had a duty to act in good faith in all its dealings with the
insured and had an additional duty not to inflict unnecessary mental
distress. Fidler v. Sun Life Assurance Co. Ltd. 2006 2 SCR 3 (Fidler);

• That the insurer repeatedly refused to provide benefits noting that they
were not “reasonable and necessary”, but never provided and reasons why
they were not reasonable and necessary;

• That damages were warranted because benefits were denied contrary to
medical recommendations;

• That the insurer took an adversarial approach to the plaintiff in the
beginning;

• That the one object of the insurance contract was to secure the plaintiff’s
peace of mind and that it was within the reasonable contemplation of the
parties that breach of peace of mind promise would bring about mental
distress; and

• That the plaintiff’s mental distress was palpable and accepted her evidence
that the change in her emotional and psychological conduct was the result
of her relationship with the insurer.

In regards to the jurisdiction argument, the insurer argued that the plaintiff was not a party to the insurance contract since it was her husband’s policy, and therefore, she was not entitled to claim for damages for mental distress.

It was further argued that Fider was distinguishable because Fidler dealt with LTD benefits not SABS benefits and that consequently, peace of mind cannot have been a contemplated term.

The appeal judge held that the reasoning in Fidler applies to an insured person under an automobile policy, whether the person is the named party or not.

“Mental distress to anyone insured under the policy upon breach would
have been within the reasonable contemplation of the insurer and the
insured and, thus, damages are recoverable pursuant to the basic
principle of compensatory damages.”

….

“People purchase motor vehicle policies to protect themselves from
financial and emotional stress and insecurity. An object of such
contracts is to secure a psychological benefit that brought the prospect
of mental distress upon breach within the reasonable contemplation of
the parties at the time the contract was made.”

In the end, the appeal judge affirmed all aspects of the trial judge’s decision only modifying the total awarded under the transportation head of damages as the trial judge provided inadequate reasons for the amount.

- Alison McBurney

Sheikh v. Pinheiro 2011 ONSC 6143

We thank M. Edward Key of O’Donnell, Robertson & Sanfilippo for this contribution to our blog.

The plaintiff was going westbound in her vehicle and the defendant taxi driver was travelling northbound in his taxi. They collided at an intersection. The defendant taxi then went on to collide with a southbound vehicle. That southbound vehicle did not collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle.

None of the drivers appeared to be hurt. They all went to the same Collision Reporting Center and filled out very detailed collision reports. There was no question who was driving what vehicle.

On the second anniversary of the collision, the plaintiff brought an action against the driver of the southbound vehicle, believing that he was the taxi driver. Essentially, the plaintiff got the other two drivers confused.
Two years after that (i.e. four years after the collision), the plaintiff commenced a separate action against the real taxi driver after realizing the mistake.

The taxi driver brought a motion for summary judgment on the basis that the action was limitation barred.

The plaintiff argued that there was a genuine issue regarding when the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the true identity of the driver that hit her vehicle. The motion judge made short work of that argument. In particular, for strategic reasons, the plaintiff did not swear an affidavit regarding the state of her personal knowledge of the issues, and the motion materials only included affidavits from their lawyers. The judge determined that the information was readily available in the form of the Self Collision Reports.

Alternatively, the plaintiff argued that there was a genuine issue for trial on the basis that she could not "discover" that her injuries were likely to satisfy the Insurance Act threshold until 2 years before she started the second action.
The motions judge rejected the plaintiff's argument. The trial judge considered that the medical evidence was clear that it was "reasonably discoverable" that the plaintiff's injuries met the threshold more than two years before the second action was commenced.

The motion judge looked not only at medical reports, but also relied on the fact that the first Statement of Claim (issued exactly 2 years after the accident) alleged that she sustained "serious and permanent injuries." The motion judge stated at paragraph 47 of his reasons that, "While this action was mistakenly directed against the wrong defendant, this assertion by the plaintiff in the Statement of Claim is akin to an admission that, by at least that time, if not earlier, the plaintiff viewed her injuries from the accident as serious and permanent, and that they had thereby discovered their potential cause of action."

Statutory Duty of Care

Morsi v. Femer Paving Ltd. [2011] O.J. No. 3960

This is an appeal from a trial decision that held York Region and Femer Paving Ltd each 25 % liable for a single car motor vehicle accident. The deceased was driving in excess of the speed limit, ignoring speed and construction signs and lost control of his vehicle when the road surface changed from fresh pavement to gravel.

The trial judge held that the plaintiff was 50% to blame for the accident, leaving the defendants with the other 50%.

York Region and Femer Paving appealed the decision.

York Region’s main submission was that after the trial Judge correctly stated the main issue and the test for resolving the issue …

“Whether at the material time Major Mackenzie drive was in a state of repair that was reasonable in the circumstances such that users of the road, exercising ordinary care, could travel upon it safely.”

… that he did not apply the test to the facts of the case.

“The evidence of Detective Stock and the Varicom tests as well as the evidence of Constable Herbert and the various engineering experts establishes that if Mark Morsi had operated his vehicle at the posted speed or even a speed modestly above it, he would have been able to successfully negotiate the transition area.”

The Ontario Court of Appeal found the driver to be reckless having accelerated to 117 km/h through a long curve and straightaway and ignoring two 60km/h speed signs, a reverse curve sign, a 40 km/h advisory sign and two construction signs. This was not a driver exercising ordinary care.

The appeal was allowed and the action by the driver’s family was dismissed.

- Alison McBurney